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course
his representation of Molen in a felony criminal proceeding arising in Boise County, State
oflda_ho. Molen appeals

propriety of the district court's grant of summary judgment in

favor of Christian.

II.

Course Of The Proceedings

On September 19, 2005, the Boise County Prosecutor charged Molen with the
offense of Felony Lewd Conduct with a Minor Child in Boise County Criminal Case State
v. ~Molen, CR 2005-1748. On November 7, 2005, Christian substituted as counsel ofrecord

in Molen's criminal case.
Molen's criminal jury trial was to commence on January 10, 2007, but Christian
arrived at the courthouse incapacitated by alcohol and unable to function. The jury trial
was vacated and reset to June 18, 2007. Christian was in alcohol in-patient treatment during
February 2007 and March 2007. (Clerk's Record, Page 7 hereinafter "R, p.'}
Molen's criminal case proceeded to jury trial on June 18, 2007. The jury returned
a guilty verdict for the charge of Lewd Conduct with a minor. On January 4, 2008, Judge
Carey sentenced Molen to a unified term of twenty (20) years, with eight (8) years fixed
and 12 years indeterminate. Molen appealed, and the Court

Appeals aJfirmed his

relief, supported

a

requested

appointment of counsel on July 14, 2011, and upon appointment of the district court,
\Villian1 O'Connor substituted as counsel on October 26,2011. On May 3, 2012, Molen's
counsel requested leave to withdraw due to health concerns. The district court granted leave
to withdraw and appointed new counsel, David Smethers. From August 29, 2012 to March
5, 2013, the district court granted three (3) requests for additional time to file an amended
petition. On April 1, 201

Molen's counsel of record filed a Second Amended Verified

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. On April

2013, Molen filed prose an unsigned 56

page Memorandum of Law in Support of Petitioner's Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
claims. (R., pp. 44 and 45). On April 10, 2013, Elisa G. Massoth substituted as counsel of
record for Molen's post-conviction case. (R., p. 46).
On December 26, 2013, Molen, through counsel, and the State filed a Statement of
Stipulated Reasons to Resolve Post-Conviction Case. The parties agreed: "the combination
of the very serious issues presented by ineffective preparation and investigation by trial
counsel warranted post-conviction relief on the grounds that ML Molen's Constitutional
rights were violated. (R., p. 295). The district court reviewed the Stipulation, but advised
the parties it would not
April 28 and April

the stipulated
14.

was set

court
3
On June 17, 2014, the district court granted Molen's request for post-conviction
relief based upon Christian's ineffective assistance. In its Decision, the district court found
Christian's "performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness in 1) failing
to consult with and/or retain an expert in pediatric sexual abuse; 2) failing to discover the
existence of the colposcopic photographs prior to trial; and 3) failing to request either a
continuance of the trial or a mistrial so that the new evidence could be reviewed by an
expert in pediatric sexual abuse." The district court vacated Molen's Judgment of
Conviction and ordered Molen to be released from custody. (R., p. 63). Molen was
incarcerated and in the custody of IDOC from June

2007 to June 17, 2014,

approximately seven (7) years.
Molen filed a Verified Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on February 1 2015,
seeking relief against Christian for legal malpractice and breach of contract (R, pp. 4-19).
On March 10, 2015, Christian filed a Motion to Dismiss contending Molen's claims were
time barred by the statute oflimitation. (R., pp. 20-23). Molen filed responsive briefing on
April

2015. Molen denied his claims were barred by the statute of limitations because

his cause

1

against Christian accrued,

20

statute
(R, pp.

3

Christian filed

no dispute in
case that
some damage upon
conviction, and there's nothing
law that said two years after that claim accrued that the
plaintiff could not have sued Mr. Christian for malpractice.

Ms. Points:

There's nothing in the law that precludes Mr. Molen from
suing Mr. Christian within two years of his statute of
limitations accrued. He's free to argue that l was actually
innocent. Just because he had a conviction sitting there,
doesn't preclude him from suing Mr. Christian in
malpractice.

(Trans. ofHrg. on Motion to Dismiss, April 9, 2015, ("Tr. Motion to Dismiss"), p.
8, p. 5,

23 - p. 6, L. 2, p. 6, L. 12-17). In response, Molen's counsel made the following

remarks:
Mr. Burrows:

Mr. Molen's cause of action for criminal legal malpractice
did not accrue until he was granted post-conviction relief,
which was June 17 [2014].

Mr. Burrows:

The argument, Your Honor, is that convicted criminal
defendant's cause of action doesn't accrue until his
conviction is set aside, because until that time, he has
suffered no legal damages or harm, and exoneration, as I
suggested, is the gateway to the damages. This is because a
convicted criminal is deemed by law to be guilty of the
crime. Until relief, his conduct is the [proximate] cause of
that conviction.

Similar to a 1983 claim, as
as a malicious
claim in Idaho,
majority rule [of] the states that have
4

set
'-''"''''-"'''"' your legal
a crime
beyond a reasonable doubt,
can sue your attorney for
your conviction. I submit that any attorney that's placed in
that position is immediately going to file a 12(b)(6) motion,
as the plaintiff cannot prove any legal cognizable damages.
Also, that the proximate cause of any damages would be the
criminal conduct of the defendant
Mr. Burrows:

As the Supreme Coutt in the Heck case points out, allowing
the convicted criminal to sue . . . his attorney when there is
an outstanding criminal judgment creates a possibility of two
conflicting resolutions arising out of the same transaction.

Mr. Burrows:

Mr. Molen was wrongfully convicted and sentenced to 20
years of prison, Your Honor. He diligently complied -with the
procedural process, and he was granted post-conviction
relief based on defendant's ineffective assistance. He spent
seven years in prison. This is not a common occurrence,
Your Honor.

Mr. Burrows:

The court should rule that in this context of a criminal
malpractice case, when the plaintiff has been granted postconviction relief, the accrual date is the date that he was
granted that post-conviction relief.

(Tr. Motion to Dismiss, p. 8, L 14-16, p. 10, L 10-1

p. 13, L 10

p. 14, L 9, p. 15, L

12). At the close of the hearing, the district court determined to take the matter under
advisement, as the application of the "exoneration rule" for purposes of the statute of
limitations was an issues of first impression in Idaho. (Trans. Motion to Dismiss, p. 19,
1

language in
stating
are disfavored,
1t 1s
unlikely Idaho will adopt a dual track procedure as required in Colorado.
Second, it seems all of the states rejecting an exoneration-type rule have a
'discovery' type rule place related to their statutes oflimitations.
The court notes the decision to adopt an exoneration rule ultimately must
be made by the Idaho Supreme Court or enacted by specific legislation such
as the legislation in the uniform post-conviction act that delays the
requirement for filing . .
(R., pp. 90-91). On August 7, 2015, Christian filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment asserting, once again, that Molen's claims were barred by the statute of
limitations. Christian also gave considerable discussion and attention to the proceedings in

Lamb v. A1anweiler, 129 Idaho 269 (1996), and argued that in the context of a criminal
legal malpractice claim, a Plaintiff must prove the additional element of "actual
innocence," while "exoneration" is not a required element. (R., pp. 244-63). Molen filed
responsive briefing with supporting documents on September 21, 201

(R, pp. 264-336).

Christian's Motion for Summary Judgment came before the district court for oral argument
on October I, 2015. Christian's counsel made the following arguments:
Ms. Points:

The law in Idaho is
clear and very well-established.
Albeit, there's only one criminal case that's with the
appellate courts. That's the Lamb v. Manweiler case that we
cited for you in great detail at all levels up through the
appeaL It's very straightforward. When someone suffered
some
s when the statute
accrues.
There's no dispute. I don't think that

6

(Tr. of Hrg. on Motion for Summary Judgment, October 1, 201
Summary Judgment"), p. 21, L 10

p.

("Tr. Motion for

3). In response, Molen's counsel and

district court engaged in the following colloquy:
Mr. Burrows:

I did discuss the Lamb decision in my memorandum, but I
think there's an important point that needs to be emphasized.
In the decision in Lamb, it strongly supports adopting the
exoneration rule, Your Honor. The Idaho Supreme Court's
ruling in Lamb is that by admitting guilt, Lamb could not
show that his attorney [proximately] caused his damage.

The Court:

But, see, this case is significantly different. I guess this is an
issue for discussion. This wasn't a guilty plea case.

Mr. Burrows:

That is correct, Your Honor.

The Court:

So [unlike] Mr. Lamb, Mr. Molen did not enter a guilty plea

Mr. Burrows:

That's correct.

The Court:

- he went to trial. And so Lamb can be distinguished on that
point, and, you know, other state case law, or interpretation
of what the Lamb decision did in Idaho, I think, is different
than what the Supreme Court actually did in Lamb because
I think that sentence may actually be dicta, not a statement
of the law, but
still distinguishable because Lamb said he
was guilty.

Mr. Burrows:

correct.

sa
issue
pled
I had had a factual basis for conviction and my counsel
me bad advise, and had he given me different advise, I
wouldn't have told the court everyihing that I knew", so I
think that that is actually very different from the Lamb case.
Mr. Burrows:

And I would agree with everything the court just said.
However, in the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Lamb,
their focus was on the fact that he made a valid entry of a
guilty plea, and, therefore, based upon that alone, that
established his legal guilt, which is the same thing as in a
conviction that establishes legal guilt, and that was the focus
in that case in Lamb.
And the district court and the court of appeals focused on
whether there was, you know, an issue of fact with actual
innocence or whether . . the plaintiff in that case ... actually
committed the underlying charge. The Supreme Court didn't
address any of that. They just went directly to the fact that
you were advised by the district court of what the charges
were, and you've pled guilty. That's legal guilt.

The Court:

Right. And, so for the district court and the court of appeals
opinion, those are not binding on this court cause they're not
published, so they're not binding. What's binding is the
Supreme Court decision that doesn't address those issues
directly.

ML Burrows:

Yes, and I agree with the court on that I just wanted to make
the distinction that really what . . the Idaho Supreme
Court's decision in Lamb supports is that, if you're legally
guilty, you don't have a cause of action on a criminal
malpractice case.

The Court:

But, in
case, the post-conviction
longer legally guilty.

8

him no

case,
filed a motion to '"'"''"""'.,
proposition that, well,
legally
so the proximate
cause of his damages is due to the conviction, and also he
likely would have argued for the exoneration rule, and I
believe that a court would actually agree with that given the
decision in Lamb because it speaks to legal innocence, not
actual innocence.
The Court:

Well, other than the fact that this is a different Supreme
Court than there was back in '96, or whatever, whenever
Lamb was decided, so you can't necessarily say that they
would rule consistently even though they have ruled once.

Mr. Burrows:

That true. But, Your Honor, that's basically my position
today. As far as, you know, the date, the accrual date for the
statute of limitations purposes, we still maintain that was the
date of exoneration. That's when there was objective proof
of some damage, or, in the alternative we argued that, it can't
be any sooner than June 21, 2014, which was the date Judge
Owen ordered disclosure of all CARE records, which when
that happened, we discovered that there was an undisclosed
audio that was related to the physical examination conducted
by Lisa Ortega. And, in that audio recording, it
demonstrates, not only that the complaining witness made
multiple [inconsistent] statements, but it also was the first
time that there was an objective record that our expert could
evaluate in Nurse Ortega's evaluation and examination
during the physical examination. An updated affidavit was
filed, and it was at that point when Judge Owen actually
granted [Molen's] relief

(Tr. Motion for Summary Judgment, p.

15

court took

p. 29, L 22). Once again, the district
2015.

9

Breach is not the only
a
cause
the tort itself is completed, there is no actual accrual of the cause action,
Just as in a normal negligence claim, there must be causation and damages.
Thus, until there is both causation and damages, there is no accruaL
(R,, pp. 352-53). Next, the district court acknowledged that "Idaho caselaw makes it clear
that in legal malpractice cases, there is a possibility that a third-party action, or event not
under the control of the parties, could be what starts accruaL (R p, 353). The district court
noted that Christian alleged that the tort was complete on Molen's conviction in 2007, and
Molen alleged the tort was completed 2014. However, there was little or no dispute as to
the timing of events and therefore, there was no issue of fact Rather, the district court was
required to decide when the cause of action accrued as a matter of law. (R., p. 354). 1
The district court stated that the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Lamb was not
based on accrual, but on the element of causation. However, the Lamb decision provided
"hints" to the resolution of this case. Id. The district court acknowledged that Lamb's guilty
pleas were themselves the proximate cause of Lamb's incarceration. According to the
district court: "Causation is still essential to an accrual determination, if the Court operates
under a completed tort theory as stated in Minnick." Id. at p. 355.

The district court noted that it had
indicated it was
to adopt
exoneration
such rule fit more line with Idai_11o' s public policy based on civil
legal malpractice cases. Id. Once again, the district court declined to adopt
rule, as "such adoption, it happens, must come through the Idaho Supreme
1

10

court
The Court feels it is constrained to conclude that Plaintiffs causes of action
against Defendant began accruing in 2007. The undisputed facts at this point
in this case show that Defendant's conduct related to Plaintiffs criminal
trial was sufficiently bad, that regardless of whether Plaintiff was actualiy
guilty or not, there was 'objectively ascertainable occurrence of some
damage' (and related causation) in 2007. Defendant showed up so drunk to
the originally scheduled trial as to be essentially incapacitated. Defendant
showed up inebriated to the rescheduled triaL Defendant's alcoholism
arguably prevented him from doing sufficient pre-trial investigation and
incapacitated his judgment in whether to move for a mistrial. These
undisputed facts alone were sufficient to put Molen on notice of Christian's
malpractice. \Vhile notice is irrelevant (because there is no discovery
standard for malpractice actions,) the Court finds that the notice does create
an objectively ascertainable occurrence of both causation and damages.
The Court does not find this result particularly equitable. Plaintiff deserved
better representation at trial, and it seems unfair to deny Plaintiff his right
to pursue and prove damages against Defendant. However, the Court
concludes this is the proper legal result under current Idaho caselaw as it
stands today. There is no need for an outside event or act of a third-party to
start accrual of the cause of action because the tort was completed in 2007
when the jury entered a guilty verdict against Mr. Molen.
Id. at pp. 355-56 (footnote omitted). Based upon the district court's ruling, it granted
Christian's Motion for Summary Judgment Molen appeals the district court's decision.

III.

Statement Of Facts

On or about June 23 2005, law enforcement investigated a report that Molen had
engaged in sexual misconduct with step-granddaughter

An interview between law

enforcement and S.Z. was conducted. In the

allegations
sUiumers

11

2004 and

conduct

CR

ammor

2005-1748. On November 7, 2005, Christian substituted as counsel of record in Molen's
criminal case. The Criminal Information was filed with the District Court on January 9,
2006. Molen pled not guilty at the arraignment Id
On or about September 13, 2006, Christian was arrested for driving under the
influence and open container. On or about January 4, 2007, Christian was arrested again
for driving under the influence and driving without privileges. This case did not proceed to
jury trial on January 10, 2007 because, on the morning of trial, Christian arrived at the
courthouse so incapacitated by alcohol that he could not function, and the trial had to be
vacated. Christian's BAC on the morning of trial was measured at .329/.344. The jury trial
was vacated and reset to June 18, 2007. Christian was in alcohol in-patient treatment during
February 2007 and March 2007. Molen was seriously concerned about Christian's ability
to represent him, but he was not able to afford new counsel. Accordingly, Christian
continued to represent Molen. (R, p. 7).
From the time Christian was out of in-patient treatment (end of March 2007), he
did not maintain sobriety and failed to adequately investigate and prepare for Molen's triaL
On or about June 2007, Molen, his wife
Gar Hackney at

his step-daughter met
house.

12

this meeting,

Christian
was so

D.

smelled the odor of alcohol on

breath

trial and received comments from Christian's secretary that Christian would be better if he
was able to take a few "nips" of alcohoL Connie also observed Christian under the influence
during the triaL (R., p. 9).
Nurse Ortega testified at trial that she conducted the CARES physical examination
of S.Z. Nurse Ortega testified that when she performed a colposcopic examination of S.Z. 's
vagina, she observed two healed tears of the hymen that were consistent with sexual abuse.
Christian was unprepared to properly cross-examine Nurse Ortega because he failed to
conduct a pretrial interview of her, and failed to communicate with his expert who would
have prepared him for a proper cross-examination. (R., p. 10).
During cross-examination of Nurse Ortega, she revealed that colposcope
photographs of S.Z:s hymen were taken. Christian failed to immediately move for a
mistrial or request a continuance so that these photographs could be reviewed by an
appropriate expert. Rather, the photographs were shown to Molen's expert Dr. Friedlander
approximately 90 minutes before

testified. Dr. Friedlander testified that the photographs

were not consistent with sexual abuse, but

repeatedly testified that he would defer to a

master pediatric gynecologist (R., p. I 0).

13

photographs,

IS

of the opinion that the photographs demonstrate a normal hymen. Dr. Guertin observed no
notches, tears, lacerations, scars, or distortion. Molen also retained the expertise of Cari
Carusso, an expert in pediatric sexual abuse. She has been a Registered Nurse since 1974,
and is licensed and Board Certified as a Forensic Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner by the
State of California. Ms. Carusso reviewed the colposcopic photographs and concludes they
demonstrate a normal genital examination. In her opinion, there is no evidence of healed
tears as Nurse Ortega testified at trial and no evidence of sexual abuse. (R., p. 11 ).
In May 2011, Mr. Molen filed a petition for post-conviction relief raising, inter alia,
ineffective assistance of trial counseL Molen v. State, CV-2011-124. On or about April
2014, Mr. Molen, through counsel, and the State learned of the existence of an additional
recorded CARES interview of S.Z. that was never disclosed. In the interview, S.Z. made
statements to Nurse Ortega that contradicted statements S.Z. had made in an earlier
interview with Stacy Lewis and with her preliminary hearing and trial testimony. (R., p.
12).
On April

2014, Molen, through counsel, and the State filed a Joint Stipulation

of Facts and Points of Authority Related to Brady Material and a Joint Motion
Judgment in Favor of Molen. On June 1 2014, the district court

14

a written

case.

1

ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL

III.

Whether The District Court Erred In Applying Existing Idaho
Caselaw And Ruling That Molen's Cause Of Action Accrued On The
Date Of His Conviction In 2007.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
STANDARD OF REVIEW

This appeal deals with the review of the district court's Order granting Christian's
Motion for Summary Judgment in a legal malpractice claim. "In an appeal from an order
of summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the same as the standard used by
the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgments." Estate ofBecker v. Callahan,
140 Idaho 522, 525 (2004) (internal citation omitted). Thus, when considering a motion for
summary judgment, the Court "liberally construes the record in a light most favorable to
the party opposing the motion and draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that
party's favor. Brooks v. Logan, 130 Idaho 574 (1997). Summary judgment is appropriate
only if the affidavits, depositions, admissions, and other evidence in the record demonstrate
that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Hines v,

129 Idaho 84 7 (1997). The burden

138 Idaho

I.

445 (2003).

The District Court Erred In Applying Existing Idaho Caselaw And Ruling
That Molen's Cause Of Action Accrued On The Date Of His Conviction In
2007. 2

The district court ruled that Molen's complaint was barred by the statute of
limitations because Christian's "conduct related to [Molen's] criminal trial was sufficiently
bad .

. there was 'objectively ascertainable occurrence of some damage' (and related

causation) in 2007. (R., p. 355). According to the district court, Christian's sufficiently
bad conduct, including: 1) Christian's drunkenness on the original date of trial; 2)
Christian's inebriated state during the rescheduled trial; 3) Christian's alcohol abuse

Molen maintains his position that his cause of action against Christian did not accrue until
Molen was granted post-conviction relief on June 17, 2014. Molen filed his Compliant on
February 17, 2015, which is within the applicable statute of limitations. In the district
court's Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, the district court declined to rule specifically on
the exoneration rule and instead held that "a material issue of fact exists whether that proof
of Plaintiff's innocence was known before the 2014 discovery of conflicting statements
made by the minor child witness, which were not disclosed by the prosecution." (R., p. 91 ).
Molen addressed this issue in his Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
For efficiency, Molen has elected not to address this issue in the body of this brief.
However, in an abundance of caution, Molen incorporates those specific facts by reference
and reserves the right to further address those issues at oral argument should this Court
deem necessary. In summary, Molen submits that a material issue of fact exists in this case
concerning the date he obtained objective proof of some actual damage. The date of
objective proof can be no earlier than January 21, 20
when the district court in Molen' s
post-conviction case ordered
alJ CARES records. It was only after that date
that Molen obtained the lh'1disclosed audio of the physical examination of the complaining
witness.
2

16

Molen. Id. at

ruling is erroneous.

While Molen would not deny that Christian's performance fell well below an
objective standard ofreasonableness, this does not lead to the legal conclusion that Molen's
cause of action accrued in 2007, simply because Molen may have been on "notice". Rather,
Molen's cause of action did not accrue until his petition for post-conviction relief was
granted, that was the date the tort was complete. Prior to that date, Molen could not
establish that Christian was the proximate cause of damages that Molen suffered. Molen
was granted post-conviction relief on June 17, 2014, and he filed his Complaint on
February 17, 2015, which is within the applicable statute oflimitations.
"An action to recover damages for professional malpractice must be commenced
within two years after the cause of action accrues." Reynolds v. Trout Jones Gledhill

Fuhrman, PA., 154 Idaho 21, 24 (2013) (internal citations omitted). "[T]he cause of action
for professional malpractice accrues as of the time of the occurrence, act or omission [of
which a party complains]." Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 585-86 (2002) (internal
citations and quotation omitted}

a cause of action "cannot accrue until some

damage has occurred. City of A1cCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656,659 (2009). There must
be objective proof that would support the

some

"[S]ome damage is required because it would be nonsensical to hold that a cause

17

at 661.
action

case.

Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 543 (1991 ). "Likewise, what constitutes 'objective proof' of the
existence of some damage suffered by the client also must be decided on the circumstances
of each case." Buxton, 146 Idaho at 662.
In its Order Granting Summary Judgment, the district court first addressed this
Court's accrual discussion in Afinnick. (R., pp. 351-52). The district court correctly
reasoned that pursuant to }vfinnick, and other Idaho case law: "until the tort itself is
completed, there is no actual accrual of the cause of action. Just as in a normal negligence
claim, there must be causation and damages. Thus, until there is both causation and

damages. there is no accrual. (R., p. 352) (emphasis added). This reasoning is sound.
Causation and damages are both elements a plaintiff must prove in a cause of action for
professional malpractice. See e.g Harrigfeldv. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 136 (2004) ("We
have always stated the fourth element of the cause of action, however, as requiring proof
that the attorney's breach of duty was a proximate cause of injury or damage to 'the
client

Until a plaintiff can make a prima facie case for legal malpractice, there can be

no accrual of the statute of limitations.
In Idaho,

is no binding authority directly on point on the

action for criminal legal malpractice accrues,

18

of when a cause

a criminal defendant successfully

prior to that point, a complaint could not

a motion to dismiss);

Therrien v. Sullivan, 153 N.R 211 (2006) (holding limitation period regarding a criminal
legal malpractice claim would not accrue until the defendant obtained direct or collateral
relief from underlying criminal conviction as action cannot withstand motion to dismiss);
Adkins v. Dixon, 253 Va. 275, 281-82 (1997) (holding statute oflimitations does not begin
to run until termination of post-conviction proceedings); Steele v. Kehoe, 747 So.2d 931
(Fla. 1999) (holding convicted criminal defendant's action for legal malpractice against
defense counsel did not accrue until obtaining appellate or post-conviction relief); see also
Shaw v. State, Dep't of Admin., Pub. Defender Agency, 816 P.2d 1358 (Alaska 1991)
(holding convicted criminal defendant must obtain post-conviction relief before pursuing
action for legal malpractice against former attorney, and statute of limitations must be
tolled until such relief is granted). The requirement of successful direct or collateral relief,
prior to filing suit against the criminal defense attorney for criminal legal malpractice, is
commonly referred to as the "exoneration rule."
though the

court declined to adopt the exoneration rule in its two

previous decisions, it was inclined to do so "because such rule fit more in line with Idaho's

19

to
on a malpractice
had the City prevailed in the litigation. Even when an attorney is
negligent, that breach of duty may not be a proximate cause
resulting damage to the client.
v,J_UC'-VL

i"A,~AUPr.C•rl

Under the circumstance of this case, the existence or effect of any alleged
negligence on the part of the City's Attorneys regarding their legal advice
and strategy depended upon the outcome of the litigation against the City
by Wausua and St. Clair. There would not be objective proof of actual
damage until that occurred. To hold otherwise in this case would foment
future litigation initiated on sheer surmise ofpotential damages in order
to avoid the likely consequences ofseeing actions barred by limitations.
Clients involved in lengthy litigation would have to file protective lawsuits
against their attorneys when following their advice and strategy, without
yet having any objective proof of actual damage or being able to prove a
cause of action for professional malpractice.
Id. at 662-63 (citations and quotation marks omitted, emphasis added by district court).
The district court then states the following:
This language supports the conclusion that it makes little sense for a
person to rely on their attorney, only to be required to file anticipatory
claims against their attorneys or risk losing the chance to sue for
malpractice.
In criminal cases, the incentives are reversed. If a person is convicted, that
person would have to simultaneously sue their attorney for malpractice
and continue to seek relief on appeal and/or seek post-conviction relief.
The direct appeal may or may not be completed before the two-year
statute of limitations runs. It is unlikely the post-conviction relief decision
will be completed within two years of the original judgment. Other states
have noted the disparity between civil and criminal legal malpractice
claims. May states reject barring a criminal defendant from bringing a
malpractice claim unless it is brought within the given tirneframe after
conviction. Instead, in these states, accrual of the statute of
starts at exoneration.
89)
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filed a
criminal defense attorney. The defense attorney moved for summary judgment on the
ground that the two year statute of limitations had run, and

trial court granted the

motion. Id. at 223, On appeal, the Supreme Court of Oregon reasoned that the pivotal
inquiry at issue was determining "when plaintiff is deemed by the law to have suffered
harm that may be attributed to defendant's alleged negligence. Id. at 228. The court stated
that "legally cognizable harm, in a criminal legal malpractice case, was something more
than a plaintiff being wrongfully convicted, Id at 228-29. In ruling that a criminal
defendant had not suffered harm until his conviction is set aside, the court made several
observations.
First, the court found that persons accused of crimes are afforded extensive
constitutional and procedural protections. The completeness of the criminal justice process,
from pretrial proceedings through post-conviction relief proceedings, "demonstrates the
legislature's intention that only those persons deserving of conviction will be, or will
remain convicted:' Id at 230. Thus, the court concluded that

is the public policy of this

state to treat any person who has been convicted of any criminal offense as validly
and until the
court reasoned that no

conviction has been reversed . ,
outcome

Id

the

the trial process is as difficult to obtain as a

Id at 231

Thus, the court ruled that a criminal defendant has not been harmed, until

exonerated through direct appeal, post-conviction relief, or otherwise. Id. at 238. The
statute of limitations did not accrue until the plaintiff suffered legally cognizable harm,
which was the date he was exonerated of the criminal offense. Id. at 239.
While not specifically addressing the issue of accrual, this Court's decision in Lamb
v. Manweiler, 129 Idaho 269 (1996), supports the adoption of the exoneration rule. In
Lamb, this Court addressed whether a plaintiff's cause of action could survive a motion for

summary judgment against his former criminal defense attorney, for allegedly providing
negligent advice in a criminal matter, which lead to the plaintiff pleading guilty and being
sentenced to prison. In Lamb, this Court ruled if the complaining party is found legally
guilty of the underlying criminal matter, the complaining party cannot establish that the
criminal defense attorney was the proximate cause of the complaining party's damages.
See Lamb, 129 Idaho at 274. Lamb was initially charged with nine felonies related to cattle

operations. Id. at 271. Manweiler represented Lamb

the initial stages

the criminal

case, and upon the advice of Manweiler, Lamb entered pleas of guilty to four felony counts.
Prior to sentencing, Manweiler discovered evidence which cast doubt on two of the guilty
pleas, and he moved to withdraw those pleas.

district court granted that motion.

be
judgment The district court found the sole issue before the court was whether Lamb was
guilty of the underlying criminal charges, and

so, Lamb would be unable to establish the

prima facie element of proximate cause. After review of the record, the district court
concluded that Lamb failed to come forward with evidence to rebut his admissions of guilt
or establish an issue of fact regarding his guilt. The district court granted Manweiler' s
motion for summary judgment. Id.
On appeal from the Idaho Court of Appeals, this Court reviewed Lamb's change of
plea hearing, and concluded:
From the transcript of the pleas it is clear that [Lamb] knew the elements
and knew the facts. He knew that he might have a defense to the charges
before he pled guilty. He also knew the choice of whether to plead guilty
was his, not that of his attorney. The choices he had were explained by the
district judge and acknowledged by ML Lamb. The proximate cause ofany
damage he may have suffered is the decision to plead guilty following a
thorough advice of rights by the district judge concerning the charge.
Lamb, 129 Idaho at 274 (emphasis added).

Court based

decision

Lamb on the element of proximate cause ("The

proximate cause of any damage [Lamb] may have suffered is [his] decision to plead guilty
Thus, Lamb could not satisfy the prima
could not prove Manweiler was

proximate cause of
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damages. This analysis and

was
In this case,

court acknowledged that

causation, however the district court's interpretation of that ruling was erroneous. In both
Lamb's case and in Molen's case, legal guilt (Lamb from pleading guilty and Molen from
being convicted) prevented both men from proving that their attorneys were the proximate
cause of damages. Thus, neither could establish a prima facie case for criminal legal
malpractice, unless they were "exonerated" and no longer legally guilty. As the district
court correctly noted, "[ c]ausation is still essential to an accrual determination, if the Court
operates under a completed tort theory as stated in l'vfinnick." (R, p. 355). Plaintiffs
counsel presented this argument to the district court on Christian's motion for summary
judgment hearing:
Mr. Burrows:

Yes, and I agree with the court on that. I just wanted to make
the distinction that really what
the Idaho Supreme
Court's decision in Lamb supports is that, if you're legally
guilty, you don't have a cause of action on a criminal
malpractice case.

The Court:

But, in this particular case, the post-conviction made him no
longer legally guilty.

Mr. Burrows:

And that's what we're arguing, Your Honor. After he was
exonerated, Mr. Molen was exonerated, he was no longer
guilty. He was legally iunocent, and that was the gateway he
had to pass through, the exoneration rule, in order to file a
claim or a cause of action for criminal
malpractice,
that's our position, is Lamb actually supports that
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The

Well, other than the fact that this is a different Supreme
Court than there was back in '96, or whatever, whenever
Lamb was decided, so you can't necessarily say that they
would rule consistently even though they have ruled once.

Mr. Burrows:

That true. But, Your Honor, that's basically my position
today. As far as, you know, the date, the accrual date for the
statute of limitations purposes, we still maintain that was the
date of exoneration.

(Tr. Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 27, L. 24 - p. 29, L. 8). 4 Other jurisdictions have
agreed that a plaintiff cause of action for criminal legal malpractice does not accrue until
exoneration, because a claim could not withstand a motion to dismiss as the plaintiff would
be unable to establish that his attorney was the proximate cause of damages.
For instance, this was the decision reached by the Supreme Court of Minnesota,
which ruled that a criminal defendant's cause of action for criminal legal malpractice did
not accrue until he was granted federal habeas corpus relief. Noske, 670 N.W.2d at 745.

4

Interestingly, the district court declined to adopt the exoneration rule despite stating its
well-reasoned position for being inclined to adopt the exoneration rule and having solid
legal grounds to support this ruling, given the Lamb and Afinnick decisions. Yet, the
district court creates a quasi "notice rule" to find "that notice does create an objectively
ascertainable occurrence of both causation and damages" in Molen's case. It is also
interesting that Christian's "sufficiently bad" pretrial and trial conduct, which was the
basis for the district court's ruling on Molen having notice (i.e. causation and damages),
appears to be the same cause for the district court's concern in ruling Christian's
("The Court does not find this result particularly equitable. Plaintiff deserved better
representation at trial, and it seems
to
Plaintiff
right to
and
damages against [Christian]. (R., p. 356).
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are an
to relitigate an

was

a

proceeding which resulted in a conviction that has not been reversed." Id.
In Heck, the United States Supreme Court concluded that in order to recover
damages under § 1983 based upon allegations that tend to impugn the validity of a criminal
conviction, a plaintiff must prove "favorable termination" of the criminal action against
him. 512 U.S. at 486-87. The Court reached this conclusion by examining the common law
action for malicious prosecution, as it was the closest analogy to the § 1983 claim. The
common law imposed a "favorable termination" requirement in malicious prosecution
actions. First, the Court stated that this requirement "avoids parallel litigation over the
issues of probable cause and guilt. Id at 484 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Specifically, it prevents "the possibility of the claimant succeeding in the tort action after
having been convicted in the underlying criminal prosecution;' a result that contravenes "a
strong judicial policy against the creation of two conflicting resolutions arising out of the
same or identical transactions. Id. Second, it prevents "collateral attack on the conviction
through the vehicle

civil suit," which is not an appropriate mechanism to challenge the

validity of an "outstanding criminal judgment Id at 484-86. Thus, the Court held:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisor1ment, or for other harm caused by actions whose
would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove
or sentence
on
appeal, expunged
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In this case, Molen's action

not accrue,

statute

of limitations purposes, until he successfully obtained post-conviction relief. Prior to that
date, there was no objective proof of some actual damage. Just like the plaintiff in Stevens,
criminal defendants in Idaho are afforded extensive constitutional and procedural
protections, including pretrial proceedings through post-conviction relief. Unless a
conviction is set aside, the criminal defendant is deemed by law to be guilty. As the court
in Stevens explained, it would be "most unusual to permit a person to prosecute a legal
malpractice action premised on some flaw in the process that led to that person's conviction
at the same time that the person's conviction remained valid for all other purposes." There
was no legally cognizable harm in Stevens until the plaintiff in that case had his conviction
set aside. As in Stevens, Molen had not suffered any actual damage until he was granted
post-conviction relief.
The decision in Lamb and Noske further illustrates the fundamental flaw in
concluding that at the time of conviction a criminal defendant has sustained some actual
damage prior to

defendant having his or

criminal case set aside

the plaintiff would

be unable to establish that his former attorney was the proximate cause of damages
(plaintiff could not withstand a motion to dismiss). With a criminal conviction
plaintiff is deemed by law to be guilty. Thus, prior to a
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being set

the
ruling

See

A1cCormack v. Caldwell, 1

Idaho 15 (CL App.

11) (recognizing "a

cause of action generally accrues when a party may maintain a lawsuit against another")
(internal citation and quotation omitted). Otherwise, a criminal defendant would be unable
to maintain a lawsuit against his former criminal attorney for malpractice.
The prudent policy considerations examined in Heck, which requires a plaintiff to
prove "favorable termination" of the underlying criminal action to recover damages under
§ 1983 action, are equally applicable in this case. 5 Concluding a criminal defendant
5

In addition to the policy issues addressed in Heck, courts holding that an action for
criminal legal malpractice does not accrue until relief from the conviction is achieved,
advance various policy arguments in reaching that conclusion. See e.g Trobaugh v.
Sondag, 668 N. W .2d 577, 5 83 (Iowa 2003) (finding an action for criminal legal malpractice
does not accrue until relief from conviction achieved, as such approach "preserves key
principles of judicial economy and comity, including the avoidance of multiple
proceedings related to the same factual and procedural issues, respect for other statutorily
created processes such as postconviction relief, and the prevention of potentially wasteful
practices such as requiring to file a legal malpractice claim which may never come to
fruition ... "); Canaan v. Bartee, 276 Kan. 116, 123 (2003) (finding policy arguments for
exoneration rule persuasive: equitable principles against shifting responsibility for criminal
action; paradoxical difficulties of awarding damages to a guilty person; proving causation;
potential undermining of post-conviction process; preservation of judicial economy by
avoiding relitigation of settled matters; creation of bright line rule for statute oflirnitations;
availability of alternative post-conviction remedies; and chilling effect on thorough defense
lawyering); Glaze v. Larsen, 207 Ariz. 26, 31 (2004) (holding "a rule that requires
termination of the underlying criminal proceedings will conserve judicial resources; the
outcome of post-conviction proceedings will often demonstrate that no malpractice suit
will lie. Shaw, 816 P.2d at 1361 (finding requirement of post-conviction
judicial economy because many issues litigated in post-conviction will be duplicated later
malpractice action);
v.
Mass.L.Rptr. 259
(2010)
accrual prior to post-conviction
would be detrimental to judicial
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procedural protections

place

available to the criminally convicted to have a judgment set aside because of incompetence
counsel, Stevens, 316 OL at 563 (quoting Shaw, 816 P.2d at 1361-62), it would be
inappropriate to allow criminal defendant to collaterally attack the outstanding criminal
conviction.
Molen respectfully submits that his cause of action did not accrue until his petition
for post-conviction relief was granted, that was the date the tort was complete. Prior to that
date, Molen could not establish that Christian was the proximate cause of damages that
Molen suffered. Molen was granted post-conviction relief on June 17, 2014, and he filed
his Complaint on February 1 2015, which is within the applicable statute oflimitations.
CONCLUSION

Trial counsel for Molen's criminal case was Ron Christian. Christian received
disciplinary action by the Idaho State Bar for his conduct involved in Molen's criminal
case. The most problematic of Christian conduct was the depths of his alcoholism at the
time that

was supposed to be preparing and investigating the facts of the case for triaL

economy because convicted criminals will "inundate the judicial system with motions to
thereby
the dockets and leaving open a myriad ofuuresolved cases for
could be decades.
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to proceed.

a period of in-patient

treatment, he continued to drink Christian continued to drink during the rescheduled triaL
His drinking and alcohol abuse prevented him from performing sufficient pretrial
investigation, including investigation of expert witnesses. Ultimately, Christian's drinking
was out of control, and his alcohol abuse compromised his judgment during triaL He failed
to move for a mistrial or a continuance, which was absolutely necessary given the late
disclosure of exculpatory evidence and \\rith no defense expert who could properly examine
and testify to the evidence. Christian should not be allowed to hide behind the statute of
limitations, especially given the sound reasoning behind the exoneration rule and the
decisions in Lamb and Minnick. Molen consistently maintained that he was innocent of the
crime and refused to take any plea deal. After approximately seven long years in prison, he
followed the appropriate legal process to finally win back his freedom. During that time in
prison, he witnessed his wife Connie suffer from a brain aneurism and die, and Molen sat
helplessly behind bars. Molen respectfully requests this Court reverse the district court's
Order Granting Christian's Motion for Summary Judgment
Dated this 25th day of April, 2016.
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